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INTRODUCTION

There was nothing surprising about the holding in Kelo v. City of
New London.1 After all, in Berman v. Parkei and again in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff,3 the Supreme Court made clear that
federal judicial review of a decision to exercise the power of eminent
domain should be extremely deferential. Nevertheless, Kelo has turned
out to be full of surprises. First, there was the Court's bitter division.
Justice O'Connor, who authored the unanimous Midkiffopinion, wrote a
scathing dissent for herself and three colleagues. And, of course, there
Copyright © 2007 by the Regents of the University of California.
Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School and John Cardinal
O'Hara, C.S.C. Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I received valuable
comments on previous drafts of this Article at the 2006 Conference on Litigating Regulatory
Takings Claims, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley, and from David
Barron, Patricia Bellia, Alejandro Camacho, John Echeverria, Daniel Mandelker, and John
Nagle. Eric Babbs provided excellent research assistance. Mistakes are my own.
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
3. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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was the unexpected post-decisional hullabaloo, which resulted in a flurry
of efforts to impose legislatively the very restrictions on eminent domain
that the Supreme Court declined to impose constitutionally.' This Article,
however, avoids this well-trodden ground and focuses instead on Kelo's
third surprise-the Court's implicit suggestion (made explicit by Justice
Kennedy in concurrence) that public, participatory planning is a
constitutional safe harbor and may separate impermissible "private"
takings from presumptively valid public ones. The Kelo majority
mentioned the words "plan" and "planning" forty times; Justice
Kennedy's separate opinion brought the tally to nearly fifty. The Court's
frequent reference to the City of New London's careful and extensive
planning effort was surprising because it was unnecessary. Kelo
reaffirmed that public use challenges are subject to rational basis review,
a standard that simply requires the Court to satisfy itself that a taking
advances some conceivable public purpose.
At a conference on litigating takings claims, it is appropriate to ask
about the legal and practical significance of Kelo's planning mandate.
This question is an important one for two related reasons. First, property
owners will likely challenge the sufficiency of pre-taking planning efforts
in future public use litigation, arguing that a failure to plan is suggestive
of impermissible private purposes. Second, Kelo's emphasis on planning
undoubtedly will influence government actors' pre-taking behavior. I
have previously argued that legal scholars underappreciate the important
role of nonjudicial government actors-the people that I call "Takers"in the eminent domain process. Takers' behavior is important because
very little eminent domain work takes place in courtrooms; most property
owners sell their property "voluntarily" under Takers' threat of eminent
domain. A more nuanced understanding of the factors influencing
Takers' decisions about which projects to pursue and which properties to
acquire is key to understanding eminent domain.' Kelo's suggestion that
planning immunizes economic-development takings from public use
challenges is one of those factors. Kelo sends a signal to Takers that
planning is good.
This Article briefly explores the constitutional and practical
significance of Kelo's planning mandate for future economic
development projects. After briefly reviewing the Court's discussion of
the planning that preceded the Kelo litigation in Part I, the Article
examines the constitutional law of planning in Part II. Specifically, Part II
examines how Kelo's emphasis on planning departs from standard

4. See, e.g., Castle Coalition, Legislative Center, http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/
(last visited Mar. 6, 2007) (describing state and federal legislative efforts).
5. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected PoliticalEconomy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. REV. 101 (2006).
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rational basis review of economic policies and asks what such a departure
means for future public use litigants. Finally, in Part III, the Article
explores three practical questions raised by the Court's decision to
encourage the government to engage in careful, detailed planning before
taking property in the name of "economic development." First, will
public, participatory planning lend legitimacy to otherwise questionable
"economic development" takings? Second, was the Court correct to
assume that planning will prevent corrupt, pretextual takings, i.e., the
taking of private property in the name of economic development but for
the true purposeof benefiting a private individual? And third, will careful
planning by the government lead to more successful projects?
I.

PLANNING IN KELO

The facts of the Kelo decision are by now familiar. Trapped for
decades in a seemingly hopeless economic spiral, the City of New
London, Connecticut-with the support and encouragement of state
officials 6- undertook
to
redevelop
the city's Fort
Trumbull
neighborhood. Project planning began in January 1998, when the city
reactivated the long-defunct New London Development Corporation
(NLDC), and the State of Connecticut authorized a $5.35 million bond
issue to support the redevelopment of Fort Trumbull. One month later,
the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer, Inc. announced plans to build a $300
million research facility on a site immediately adjacent to the Fort
Trumbull neighborhood. The extent of Pfizer's influence over the project
is a matter of significant dispute. The Court, following the city's lead,
suggested that "local planners hoped that Pfizer would draw new business
to the area, thereby serving as a catalyst to the area's rejuvenation." 7 The
petitioners, on the other hand, suggested that the Fort Trumbull project
was essentially undertaken at Pfizer's behest.8
Beginning in April 1998, NLDC held a series of neighborhood
meetings to educate residents about the redevelopment process. Soon
thereafter, the Connecticut Department of Economic and Community
Development determined that the Fort Trumbull project might have a
significant environmental impact. This ruling triggered a full
"Environmental Impact Evaluation," which required the examination of

6. See Brief of Respondent at 1, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No.
04-108), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 273 (noting that in 1990, the Connecticut Office of
Planning and Management designated New London a "distressed municipality").
7. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005).

8. See Brief of Petitioners at 4-5, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108), available at
http://supreme.1p.findlaw.com/supreme-court/briefs/04-108/04-108.mer.pet.pdf
(characterizing
Pfizer as the "10,000 pound gorilla" and noting that the plan incorporated all of Pfizer's
"conditions" were incorporated into the plan); see also infra notes 1188-124 and accompanying
text.
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the project's possible effects on air and water quality, traffic patterns, air
pollution, flood prevention, historical buildings, etc., as well as the plan's
consistency with local and state planning documents. The Environmental
Impact Evaluation also required more neighborhood meetings, the
solicitation and review of community opinion, and a forty-five day noticeand-comment period. After the State Office of Planning and
Management approved the Environmental Impact Evaluation, NLDC
formulated the specific development plan at issue in Kelo. The plan was
finalized in August 1999, and formally adopted in January 2000.'
The development plan included a state park, a waterfront conference
hotel, a "small urban village," recreational and commercial marinas, and
approximately eighty new residences." The plan required the assembly of
115 parcels of private property in the Fort Trumbull area, and the New
London City Council authorized NLDC to acquire these properties by
eminent domain if necessary." Although most property owners sold
voluntarily, seven individuals (who owned a total of fifteen parcels in the
middle of the redevelopment area) refused.12 After several months of
unsuccessful negotiations, NLDC decided to acquire these properties by
eminent domain. 3 Two months later, the owners of the targeted
properties filed an action in state court, arguing that the takings ran afoul
of the "public use" limitations of the Fifth Amendment and the
Connecticut Constitution.14 Nearly four years later, the U.S. Supreme
Court granted the owners' petition for certiorari and agreed to review the
Connecticut Supreme Court's determination that the takings were
constitutional. 15
A sharply divided Court affirmed the Connecticut Supreme Court's
decision. Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Stevens rejected the
owners' argument that the Fifth Amendment's public use limitation
precluded the city from taking property from one private owner and
transferring it to another to promote "economic development."' 6 Justice
Stevens emphasized the Court's longstanding tradition of deferring to
political decisions to exercise eminent domain. He noted that in cases
throughout the twentieth century, especially Midkiff17 and Berman, 8 the
Court had interpreted the term "public use" expansively to include
takings that will advance any public purpose, and not simply those
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at 5-6, 9.
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474.
See id.at 473-75.
See Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at 7.
See id.at 9.
See Brief of Petitioners, supra note 8, at 7.
Seeid.at 9.
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Berman v. Parker, 438 U.S. 26 (1954).
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enabling property to be acquired for public use or ownership. In keeping
with Berman and Midkiff, however, Justice Stevens emphasized that "the
City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners' land for the
purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party."' 9
It was in drawing this line between permissible and impermissible
takings that the planning process emerged as constitutionally significant.
Throughout the Kelo majority opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized the
exhaustive and participatory nature of New London's planning effort.2"
He suggested that the city's comprehensive planning efforts helped
guarantee that the takings advanced public purposes.2" Justice Stevens
also suggested the converse-i.e., that takings benefiting private parties
effected outside a comprehensive planning process would raise
constitutional red flags. A "one-to-one transfer of property, executed
outside the confines of an integrated development plan," he wrote,
"would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was afoot."22
In a short concurrence, Justice Kennedy went further than the
majority, suggesting that the lack of comprehensive planning might
render certain takings presumptively invalid. 3 While Kennedy refused to
"conjecture" about when such a presumption might apply, he explained
why he could comfortably conclude that Kelo was not such a case. First,
"[t]his taking occurred in the context of a comprehensive development
plan meant to address a serious city-wide depression, and the projected
economic benefits of the project cannot be characterized as de minimus."
Second, "the identities of most of the private beneficiaries were unknown
at the time the city formulated its plans." Third, the "city complied with
elaborate procedural requirements that facilitate . . . inquiry into the
city's purposes."24 Thus, Kennedy concluded that the takings at issue in
Kelo clearly fell out of the universe of "suspicious" takings that justified a
presumption of "impermissible private purpose." 5
II.

PLANNING IN TAKINGS LAW

Especially because he was the controlling fifth vote in the case,
future public use litigants will undoubtedly ask courts to grapple with
Justice Kennedy's musings about planning. Property owners are certain

19. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477; see also Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245 ("A purely private taking could
not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose
and would thus be void.").
20. See. e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 ("The City has carefully formulated an economic
development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community.").
21. See id. at 478.
22. Id. at 486-87.
23. Id. at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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to challengethe sufficiency of pre-taking planning efforts, and Takers will
seek refuge in the procedural complexities of economic development
plans. This Part briefly explores the constitutional significance of Kelo's
planning mandate. The discussion focuses first on the role that planning
has played in previous regulatory takings and public use cases. It then
turns to the tension between a public use planning mandate and
conventional rational basis review of economic policies. Finally, the
Article draws upon several recent public use cases to explore the role that
planning might play in post-Kelo public use litigation.
A.

Planningas a Basis for Deferencein Takings Cases

In one sense, the Court's frequent references to New London's
planning effort were unremarkable. Indeed, in both regulatory takings
and public use cases, the Court often has cited governmental planning
efforts to bolster the case for judicial deference. In regulatory takings
cases, for example, the presence or absence of planning is used to gauge
whether a challenged regulation runs afoul of the oft-cited Armstrong
principle-that the Fifth Amendment was designed "to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."26 Consider
the dueling majority and dissenting opinions in Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. City of New York. While the dissent complained
that the ordinance impermissibly singled out select property owners to
bear the burden of historic preservation,27 the majority argued that "New
York City law embodies a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of
historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be found in the city."2
In subsequent decisions that applied the balancing test adopted in Penn
Central,the Court has suggested that comprehensive planning provides
evidence that the governmental interests advanced by a regulatory rule
outweigh the burden imposed on individual property owners. In the
26. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); accordDolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong,364 U.S. at 49); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1,
9 (1988); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S.
587, 608 (1987); First Evangelical Lutheran Church v; Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1987);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978); see also William Michael
Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151 (1997). See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for
Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 747 (1993) (noting that the Armstrong
principle has become part of the "ritual litany" employed in takings cases); Thomas W. Merrill,
Dolan v. City of Tigard: ConstitutionalRights as Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 880
n.100 (1995) (observing that the statement in Armstrong"has taken on the quality of a canonical
recitation").
27. See Penn Central,438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). On the "singling out"
problem in takings law, see Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, andSpecial Interests,77 VA. L. REV.
1333, 1344 (1991).
28. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 132.
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recent Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council decision, for example, the
Court considered a regulatory takings challenge to a thirty-two month
moratorium on all new development in the Lake Tahoe basin.2 9 The
Court rejected the property owners' suggestion that the Fifth
Amendment's takings clause automatically required compensation for
the losses resulting from the development ban. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court discussed the importance of comprehensive
planning at length and expressed concern that over-constitutionalizing
the law of planning would be contrary to the public interest.3"
Planning efforts also have played a role in previous public use cases.
Importantly, in Berman v. Parker, the Court considered the
constitutionality of a redevelopment plan predicated on the need to
eliminate blighted residential conditions in southwest Washington, D.C.3 1
The owner of a department store slated for demolition objected to his
property's inclusion in the plan, arguing that the building was neither
residential nor blighted. In rejecting this claim, the Court emphasized the
comprehensive nature of the redevelopment plan conceived by the
National Capital Planning Commission. Justice Douglas, writing for a
unanimous court, observed that "[t]he experts concluded that if the
community were to be healthy, if it were not to revert again to a blighted
or slum area ... the area must be planned as a whole .... If owner after
owner were permitted to resist . . .integrated plans for redevelopment
would suffer greatly. 3 2 Just as in Kelo, the Berman Court relied upon the
community's comprehensive planning efforts to justify its deference to
individual elements of the plan, including the broad use of eminent
domain to effect private-to-private transfers of property.
B.

PlanningandRationalBasisReview

Kelo and Berman differ in one significant respect, however. In
Berman, the Court never suggested that the failure to plan
comprehensively might negate the case for judicial deference. On the
contrary, in Berman, and again in Midkiff, the Court suggested that the
eminent domain power and the police power are coterminous,33 and that,

29. See Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
30. See id.at 329-32 (refusing to apply categorical takings analysis adopted in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Commission to temporary moratoria); see also id at 336-40 (stressing
the importance of comprehensive land use planning devices, including moratoria).
31. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 30 (1954).
32. Id.at 34-35.
33. Id. at 32 ("We deal, in other words, with what has traditionally been known as the
police power."); see also id.at 33 ("Once the object is within the authority Congress, the right to
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is
merely the means to the end."); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) ("The
'public use' requirement is thus coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.").
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therefore, "public use" challenges are subject to rational basis review.
Rational basis review, as every first-year law student learns, generates
predictable results-the government wins.' Moreover, standard rational
basis review does not require that the government even articulate the
justification for its policy. Instead, rational basis scrutiny requires the
reviewing court to satisfy itself that the challenged policy advances some
conceivable public purpose.35 Midkiff makes clear that this traditional
version of rational basis review applies in the public use context. Writing
for a unanimous court, Justice O'Connor observed, "where the exercise
of eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose, the court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed
by the Public Use Clause."36 The Court, O'Connor emphasized, would
not "substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as to what
constitutes a public use 'unless the use be palpably without reasonable
foundation."' 37 Her words echoed those of Justice Douglas in Berman.
"[W]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared
in terms well-nigh conclusive."38
In other words, it is not immediately obvious why planning is
relevant to rational basis review of an exercise of eminent domain. In
regulatory takings cases, the relevance of planning is clear. When a
property owner challenges a regulation as confiscatory, courts must weigh
governmental interests against private ones (in the partial-takings
context), or determine whether the government is asking owners to bear
a disproportionate burden of providing public benefits (in the exactions
context). 39 Both Penn Central balancing and Nollan-Dolan
proportionality review require the court to consider the actual goals and
interests advanced by a regulatory policy. Not only do planning
documents represent concrete expressions of the governmental interests
at stake, but the very fact that the government engages in planning may
suggest seriousness of purpose. In contrast, because public use cases are
34. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Land Use Regulationsin an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75
N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1253-54 (1997) (describing the "bottom-line dynamics" of rational basis
review in land use context: "Local governments won, aggrieved property owners lost.").
35. See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241 ("[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is
rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated
taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.").
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680 (1896).
38. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954); see also Midkifl, 467 U.S. at 239 (quoting
Berman, 348 U.S. at 32).
39. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 134 (1978) (articulating
factors relevant for determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred, including "the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant" and "the character of the governmental
action"); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring government to
demonstrate "rough proportionality" in regulatory exactions, i.e., that they are "related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development").
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governed by rational basis review, the government's concrete
commitments should be irrelevant. The relevant inquiry is whether the
takings advance conceivable public purposes, not necessarily the goals of
articulated, thorough planning efforts. As Richard Epstein has observed,
the "expression 'conceivable public purpose' suggests that the court, in its
search for a 'rational basis,' can supply a purpose that the legislature itself
missed."4 ° (And, indeed, the Court in Kelo refused to examine whether
New London's plans would in fact advance the stated goal of economic
development.4")
That said, there are at least two reasons why the conceivability
loophole of rationality review does not map easily onto a public use
challenge. First, the government exercises the power of eminent domain
to acquire property for real reasons, not speculative ones. Eminent
domain laws universally require an ex ante statement of the "ends"
justifying the condemnation. In most states, and for all takings by the
federal government, eminent domain is a judicial proceeding.4 2 After
satisfying the necessary prerequisites,43 the Taker files pleadings which,
inter alia, describe the land to be taken, and, importantly, set forth the
public use for which it is being taken. 44 The purpose used to justify the
taking must be pleaded with particularity in many states.45
The fact that the government is legally bound to justify every
exercise of eminent domain with an ex ante statement of purpose
undercuts Midkiff's insistence that a proper respect for the prerogatives
of the political branches requires courts to speculate about conceivable
justifications for an exercise of eminent domain. The Court has held that
such speculation is inappropriate when the government has articulated
the purpose of its policy, which it must do each time it exercises the
power of eminent domain. For example, in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal,
the Court considered an equal protection challenge to a county's practice
of reassessing property for tax purposes only when title changed hands.46
The Court invalidated the assessment scheme because similarly situated
40.

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN 162 (1985).
41. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005) ("[W]e decline to second
guess the City's considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan.").
42. See 6 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 24.05[1] (2006) (noting
prevalence of judicial model in states); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 71A (2002) (setting forth
procedure for condemnations in federal courts). In a few states, takings may be effected
administratively, by the passage of an ordinance or resolution to take certain designated land
and award compensation to the owners. See SACKMAN, supra, 24.04.
43. Such prerequisites include, for example, the requirement in most states that the
condemnor attempt to purchase the property before instituting a condemnation. See id I
26A.02[1].
44. See id.
45. See id 26A.02[1], nn.5 & 24.
46. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
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property owners bore drastically different tax burdens. 47 However, a
decade later in Nordlinger v. Hahn, the Court rejected an equal
protection challenge to California's Proposition 13, which had a nearly
identical effect.' In distinguishing the cases, the Court relied upon the
fact that the county in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal had asserted that its
assessment scheme was "rationally related to its purpose of assessing
properties at true current value," which, as a matter of logic, it could not
be. The Court reasoned that when the government articulates a purpose
for its action, it will be held to that purpose. "[T]he Equal Protection
Clause does not demand . . . that a governing decisionmaker actually
articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification
... [but it] does require that a [stated] purpose may conceivably or may
reasonably have been the purpose and policy."49 The Court cited
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glandei ° as authority for this proposition,
observing that "after the Court in Wheeling Steel determined that the
statutory scheme's stated purpose was not legitimate, the other purposes
did not need to be considered because 'having themselves specifically
declared their purpose, the ... statutes left no room to conceive of any
other purpose for their existence.' 5.
Second, conceivability review fits uncomfortably with the Court's
oft-repeated admonition that the exercise of eminent domain for a purely
private purpose would run afoul of the Fifth Amendment's public use
limitation." Rational basis review does not require the government to
provide any assurances that a given exercise of eminent domain is
necessary, or even related, to any particular policy. So long as some
conceivable purpose justifies the exercise of eminent domain, the means
by which the government acquires land is essentially beyond scrutiny.
The Court emphasized this point in the regulatory takings context only a
few weeks before Kelo was decided. In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.Inc., the
Court abandoned the frequently mentioned, but rarely applied, dicta that
a regulation that fails to "substantially advance legitimate state interests"

47.

Id.at 341.

48. 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
49.

Id. at 15 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

50. 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
51.

Nordlinger,505 U.S. at 16 n.7 (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522,

530 (1959)).
52. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) ("[T]he City would no
doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners' land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit
on a particular private party."); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) ("To be
sure, the Court's cases have repeatedly stated that 'one person's property may not be taken for
the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though
compensation be paid."') (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)); id.
at 245 ("A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use clause; it
would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.").
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effects a regulatory taking. 3 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
O'Connor emphasized that the effectiveness of a regulatory regime was
irrelevant to the takings analysis. 4 The Court made a similar argument in
Kelo, rejecting the property owners' suggestion that the public use
limitation requires inquiry into whether a taking will in fact generate the
public purposes used to justify it.55 In other words, the Court has
suggested that it will not consider whether eminent domain in fact
advances the stated purpose for a taking while at the same time
suggesting that some unstatedpurposesare illegitimate.
The Court's concern that a government's stated justifications for
seizing property may be pretextual-i.e., used to camouflage purely
private transfers-is, however, in keeping with a long line of cases
expressing concern that a legislature might use pretextual and valid
justifications to accomplish invalid purposes. This concern was expressed
as early as McCulloch v. Maryland, in which Justice Marshall observed
that "should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass
laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government,
it would be the painful duty of this tribunal.., to say that such an act was
not the law of the land."56 Since then, the Court has suggested that it has a
duty to investigate whether government actors are using pretextual
justifications to exceed their constitutional authority in equal protection
and commerce clause cases, as well as in cases interpreting the scope of
Congress' Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers.57
Justice Stevens' observation in Kelo that the City would not be
"allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose,
when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit" is consistent
with this tradition. 8 The need to distinguish constitutionally valid takings
for public purposes from invalid takings for private purposes helps
explain the significance that the Court placed on planning in Kelo. Just as
planning informs decisions about the weight of the government's interest
in regulatory takings cases, planning can instruct a reviewing court about
the legitimacy of the government's motivations in public use cases. Both
53. 544 U.S. 528, 531 (2005) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
54. See id.at 543.
55. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488.
56. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,423 (1819).
57. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-56 (1966) (applying McCulloch's
reasoning); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) ("RFRA is so out of proportion to
a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 414-18 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing review of facially neutral laws
in dormant commerce clause cases).
58. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005); see also id.at 491 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike
down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular party, with only
incidental or pretextual public justifications.").
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the majority opinion in Kelo and Justice Kennedy's concurrence suggest
that planning almost always precludes a finding of pretext. Indeed, it is
telling that immediately after explaining the illegitimacy of pretextual
public takings, Justice Stevens exclaims, "The takings before us, however,
would be executed pursuant to a 'carefully considered' development
plan."59 Whether planning actually 'serves to prevent the government
from using the power of eminent domain to advance private purposes is a
subject of further discussion below. As a matter of federal constitutional
law, however, it is fairly clear that Kelo proceeds on the assumption that
planning and pretext are usually incompatible.
C.

The Significance of Planningin FuturePublic Use Litigation

Most post-Kelo public use litigation will take place in state courts,
not federal ones. Not only did Kelo reemphasize that the role of federal
courts in reviewing compensated takings is "extremely narrow,"' but,
since the decision, many state legislatures are considering-or have
enacted-laws restricting the power of eminent domain.6 Several state
courts have also entered the fray by interpreting state constitutional
limits to prohibit the kind of takings at issue in Kelo.62 Still, Kelo leaves
open the possibility of future federal public use challenges by
reemphasizing that the Fifth Amendment prohibits the use of eminent
domain to advance a purely private purpose. Since it is reasonable to
expect that few Takers will be so sloppy as to admit that the eminent
domain power is being exercised for purely private purposes, both state
and federal courts likely will face allegations that assertions of public
purposes are pretextual. It is here that Kelo carves out a role for
planning: government officials will view planning as a constitutional safe
harbor and private litigants will consider a lack of planning a
constitutional red flag. This Section briefly examines two practical
ramifications of these assumptions. First, the failure to plan may lead to
the invalidation of some takings, regardless of the potential public
benefits that might be generated. Second, Kelo's planning mandate may

59. Id. at 478 (majority opinion); see also id.at 493 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that
a presumption of invalidity was inappropriate because "[t]his taking occurred in the context of a
comprehensive development plan").
60. Id. at 500 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954));
see also Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff , 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984) (quoting Berman).
61. See Castle Coalition, supra note 4 (tracking eminent domain reform in state and
federal legislatures).
62. See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770 (Mich. 2004) (invalidating
economic development takings on state constitutional grounds); City of Norwood v. Homey, 853
N.E.2d 1115, 1123 (Ohio 2006) (holding that Ohio Constitution prohibits use of eminent domain
solely to promote economic development).
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limit the government's ability to resort to "quick-take" eminent domain
procedures in some contexts.
1.

Planningand Pretext

My first observation about how Kelo's planning mandate may play
out in subsequent cases is what might be called the Costco/NASCAR
problem-that is, takings justified by the need for "economic
development," but occurring outside of a comprehensive development
plan, may become constitutionally suspect. In two now-notorious cases
involving such takings, courts relied on the lack of pre-takings planning to
reject as pretextual an "economic development" rationale. First, in 99
Cents Only Stores v. LancasterRedevelopment Authority,a district court
rejected a local government's effort to condemn property leased by the
plaintiff in order to accommodate the expansion demands of the discount
retailer, Costco Wholesale Corporation.63 Both stores were located in a
shopping center known as the "Power Center." Although a recent
comprehensive study had found that Costco should expand onto a vacant
parcel of land, Costco demanded that the Authority condemn the space
occupied by 99 Cents Only. 6 At this point, "fearful of Costco's relocation
to another city," the Authority relented. The Authority agreed to acquire
99 Cents Only from its landlord through a "friendly eminent domain
proceeding," in which the city would purchase the property for $3.8
million, relocate 99 Cents Only, and sell the property to Costco for one
dollar.65
The district court found that the Authority's assertion that the
condemnation was necessary to prevent the "reestablishment of blight"
was "palpably without reasonable foundation" and thus, invalid even
under Midkiffs lax standards. The court reasoned that the asserted public
purpose of future-blight prevention was pretextual:
In this case, the evidence is clear beyond dispute that Lancaster's
condemnation efforts rest on nothing more than the desire to achieve
the naked transfer of property from one private party to another.
Indeed, Lancaster itself admits that the only reason it enacted the
Resolutions of Necessity was to satisfy the private expansion demands
of Costco.66
In rejecting the Authority's argument that acceding to that demand was
in the public interest because the loss of an "anchor tenant" would doom
the Power Center to failure,67 the district court noted that the asserted

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
Id. at 1126-27.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1129 (emphasis added).
Id
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public use justifying the taking (blight prevention) emerged in litigation.68
The need to placate Costco to prevent blight therefore did not result
from the kind of "carefully considered" planning that the Kelo Court
thought characterized New London's efforts. On the contrary, the only
available plans-conceived by the Power Center's owner-suggested that
Costco expansion could, and should, be accommodated without seizing 99
Cents Only.
In Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City
Environmental(SWIDA), the Illinois Supreme Court similarly rejected
as pretextual an assertion that a challenged condemnation would
promote economic development.69 In 1998, Gateway International
Motorsports Corporation sought to purchase its neighbor, National City
Environmental, for parking needed to accommodate its expansion plans.
National City refused to discuss the matter. Rather than attempt further
negotiations, Gateway filed a "Quick-Take Application Packet" with the
Southwestern Illinois Development Authority (SWIDA). The application
asked SWIDA to condemn the land for Gateway in exchange for an
application fee and a commission."v National City countered that this use
of the eminent domain power was inconsistent with the takings clauses of
the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The Illinois Supreme Court
agreed. The court accepted that the stated justifications for the
condemnation-the promotion of economic development and the
minimization of traffic problems associated with the racetrack-were
"public" ones. It reasoned, nevertheless, that the means by which
SWIDA sought to advance that goal-to "advertise that, for a fee, it
would condemn land at the request of 'private developers' for the 'private
use' of developers"-exceeded the state and federal constitutional limits
on the eminent domain power."
In the months leading up to the litigation in the case, both SWIDA
and the local county board held hearings and made specific findings that
the additional parking would serve both an economic development and
public safety function; again at the trial court level, SWIDA proffered
expert testimony suggesting that inadequate parking at the Gateway
facility posed serious public safety problems.7 2 This evidence failed to
convince the Illinois Supreme Court, in large part because of SWIDA's
failure to plan. The court observed:

68. Id. at 1130.
69. 768 N.E.2d 1 (Il. 2002). The opinion reversed an earlier decision upholding the
condemnation. No. 87809, 2001 11. LEXIS 478 (Ill. Apr. 19, 2001), vacated andreh'g granted,
748 N.E.2d 194 (Ill.
2001).
70. See SWIDA, 768 N.E.2d at 4.
71. Id. at 10.
72. Id. at 4-6.
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SWIDA did not conduct or commission a thorough study of the
parking situation at Gateway. Nor did it formulate any economic plan
requiring additional parking at the racetrack. . . . Clearly, the
foundation of this taking is rooted not in the economic and planning
process with which SWIDA has been charged. Rather, this action was
undertaken solely in response to Gateway's expansions goals .... It
appears SWIDA's true intentions were to act as a default broker of
land for Gateway's proposed parking plan.73
Because Kelo's reliance on planning suggests the impermissibility of not
planning, future litigants undoubtedly will ask courts to draw similar
inferences from a lack of planning. For this reason, National City
Environmental should sound a cautionary note for government officials
eager to accommodate the demands of private interests promising
"economic development" in exchange for compulsory land acquisition
services.
In a recent case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court drew such an
inference. In Rhode Island Economic Development Corporation v.
Parking Company,74 the court held that the acquisition of an airport
parking facility ran afoul of the Fifth Amendment's public use limitation
after finding that the asserted "economic development" rationale was
pretextual. The facts of the case were unusual and convoluted. In
exchange for the construction of a multi-million dollar parking facility
adjacent to the Providence airport, the Rhode Island Department of
Transportation granted a private company the exclusive right to operate
all airport parking concessions for twenty years. The parties also entered
into an option contract, granting the airport authority the right to buy out
the contract in accordance with a sliding scale of stipulated purchase
prices. During the late 1990s, the parties agreed to expand the facilities
devoted to valet parking at the airport.
Unfortunately, demand for this high-end service fell precipitously
following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In an effort to
increase parking revenues, the airport authority then sought to convince
the owner of the parking facility to move or close the valet parking
service. When the parking company refused, the airport authority sought
to acquire a "temporary easement" in the facility by eminent domain.
This easement would have enabled the airport authority to operate the
parking facility and would have effectively negated the original twentyyear agreement between the parties. 75 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that the taking was unconstitutional, finding that assertions that
acquiring an easement would "enable [the airport authority] to promote a
growing economy, [and] encourage the expansion of... commercial
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 10.
892 A.2d 87 (R.I. 2006).
Id. at 91-95.
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industry" were conclusively unsupported.76 The court ruled that the
taking was "arbitrary" and in "bad faith," observing that "such hasty
maneuvering bears little resemblance to the comprehensive and thorough
economic development plan that was undertaken and upheld . . . in
' 77
[Kelo].

Read together, these three cases suggest that some takings that
generate significant public benefits may be unconstitutional if a court can
reasonably infer that the public economic benefits were not the actual
reason the property was taken. The possibility of this inference is
particularly likely when the primary beneficiary is a private party
demanding property. Consider, as a final example, a never-litigated case
in the community where I live. AM General, L.L.C., has manufactured
High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (or "Humvees") for the
U.S. military at a plant in unincorporated St. Joseph County, Indiana
since 1986. In 1992, AM General began to use this plant to manufacture
ultra-luxury sport utility vehicles (known as the "Hummer" or "HI") for
civilian use."8 In December 1998, General Motors (GM) approached AM

General about purchasing the "Hummer" trademark, a move which
would enable GM to manufacture a more affordable Hummer sport
utility vehicle. The two automakers agreed that GM would acquire
exclusive rights to the Hummer trademark and that AM General would
manufacture the smaller, more affordable, "H2" for GM. This agreement
was conditioned upon AM General acquiring the property for a new
630,000-square-foot manufacturing facility very quickly.7 9
AM General and GM decided to build the new plant directly
adjacent to the existing Humvee facility.' To complete the project, AM
General needed to acquire fifty-two separate lots in a low-density, bluecollar, residential neighborhood. During the negotiations with GM, AM
General secured assurances that St. Joseph County would acquire the
land needed by eminent domain if necessary to complete the project on
time. 8 After the deal was finalized, the County began to take steps to
pave the way for condemnations, including declaring the parcels in
'
question "blighted."82
These initial legal moves upset residents, 83 and

76. Id. at 106.
77. Id.
78. See AM General: Corporate History, http://www.amgeneral.com/corporate-history.php
(last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
79. Interview with Craig MacNab, Dir. of Pub. Relations, AM General, in South Bend,
Ind. (July 8, 2005) [hereinafter McNab Intervieg]; see also Anita Munson, Concrete Pouredfor
Plant,SOUTH BEND TRIB., Aug. 16,2000, at B8.
80. McNab Interview,supranote 799; see also Munson, supra note 79.
81. Interview with Patrick McMahon, Exec. Dir., ProjectFuture, in South Bend, Ind. (July
29, 2005) [hereinafter McMahon Intervieul.
82. Id.
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lawyers for objecting property owners threatened to challenge the
County's acquisitions on public use grounds." At this point, the County
agreed to allow more time for private negotiations. Over the following
few months, the County purchased all of the properties voluntarily, but
under the threat of eminent domain. The County now leases the property
back to AM General.
In the post-Kelo world, would the County's threatened resort to
eminent domain withstand public use scrutiny? The answer is less clear
than angry post-Kelo rhetoric might suggest. Certainly, the stated
justification for the takings-economic development86 - is now
established as a constitutionally valid purpose. And, the County had good
reason to believe that the plant would promote economic development.
The H2 facility was projected to create 1,500 new manufacturing jobs-a
prize in any Rust Belt community.87 Yet, the project would also raise
many of Justice Kennedy's red flags-the private beneficiaries (AM
General and GM) were clearly identifiable; the project arose at the
request of (or behest of) AM General, who in turn was responding to a
demanding timetable imposed by GM. While St. Joseph County has a
general policy of promoting industrial development whenever possible,
this particular project took place outside of the normal planning process.88
It is too soon to tell how Kelo's planning mandate will play out in such
cases, but undoubtedly future litigants will force courts to define the role
of planning in economic development efforts that rely on the use-or
threat-of eminent domain.89
2.

Planningand Quick-Take

Second, some property owners may turn Kelo-inspired planning
efforts against Takers, using planning as a basis for challenging their
decision to use "quick-take" eminent domain powers. State and federal
83. See Deanna McCool, 2 OwnersFindAM GeneralDealFair,SOUTH BEND TRIB., Mar.
29, 2000, at D1 (noting that "17 homeowners ... file[d] a remonstrance opposing a blight
designation for the area").
84. See Rick Thackery, ProposedHummer PlantRaises Eminent Domain Questions, IND.
LAW., Mar. 29, 2000, at 6.
85. See id
86. Before condemning the properties, the County also would have had to declare them
"blighted," which undoubtedly would strengthen the constitutional case. McMahon Interview,
supra note 81.
87. See Jack Colwell, Homeowners Near Plant Get More Time; Company Says Project
WillProceed,SOUTH BEND TRIB., Feb. 23, 2000, at Al.
88. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491-92 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(discussing factors that may raise suspicion of pretext). On economic development in St. Joseph
County, Indiana, see Project Future, http://www.projectfuture.org/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
89. See, e.g., W. Seafood Co. v. United States, 202 F. App'x 670 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting
property owner's claim that asserted public purpose was pretextual because the extensive pretakings planning paralleled New London's efforts in Kelo).
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quick-take statutes permit the government to obtain title and possession
to property prior to a final judgment in an eminent domain action.'
Quick-take procedures are usually justified by something akin to the
Fourth Amendment doctrine of "exigent circumstances"-that the delay
attendant to a full condemnation proceeding would jeopardize many
public projects. For example, the leading eminent domain treatise states
that quick-take statutes were enacted after "urgent public transportation,
communication, and urban renewal projects illustrated the many
inadequacies in the traditional [eminent domain] procedures."'" The
Supreme Court approved of quick-take in principle as early as 1890,
when, in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway Co., the Court
upheld a federal statute that authorized the defendant to enter into tribal
lands for the purpose of constructing a railroad. 9 The Court rejected the
Cherokee Nation's argument that the law violated the Takings Clause
because it did not require the railroad to provide compensation before
occupying the land and beginning construction.93 The Court has
reaffirmed this holding on several subsequent occasions. 94
These cases do not necessarily imply, however, that quick-take
procedures are constitutional in all of their applications. The Supreme
Court has expressed a strong preference for as-applied constitutional
challenges,95 which, in the eminent domain context, might require a
showing that the resort to quick-take powers was necessary to the success
of a particular project. Yet extensive pre-taking planning arguably
undercuts the "exigency" justification for seizing property prior to
adjudicating takings claims. Planning takes time-the very thing that
Takers exercising quick-take powers argue they cannot afford to spare.
Some litigants, therefore, may attempt to use Taker's efforts to comply
with Kelo's planning mandate to challenge the resort to quick-take
90. See Declarations of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3114-3115 (2006); SACKMAN, supra note
42, 24.10. The standard quick-take procedure requires the condemner to file a "declaration of
taking" as well as deposit of the appraised fair market value of the property with the court. See
SACKMAN, supra note 42, 1 24.10.
91. SACKMAN, supranote 42, $ 24.10[2].
92. 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
93. Id. at 658-59 ("The Constitution declares that private property shall not be taken 'for
public use without just compensation.' It does not provide or require that compensation be
actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken.").
94. See, e.g., Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1919); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380,
400-03 (1894).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). The Selamo Court held:
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that the Bail Reform Act might
operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient
to render it wholly invalid.
Id.at 745.
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authority. Limiting quick-take eminent domain powers to truly "exigent"
situations also would be consistent with the procedural due process
principle that "[i]n situations where the State feasibly can provide a
predeprivation hearing before taking property, it generally must do so
regardless of the adequacy of a postdeprivation tort remedy to
compensate for the taking."'96
III. WHY PLAN? NONCONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF KELOYS PLANNING MANDATE

Kelo's reliance on planning has practical as well as constitutional
significance. Indeed, the legal significance of the Court's discussion of
planning is far more difficult to predict than Takers' practical response to
it. Since Kelo encourages planning, more planning will occur. This final
Part of the Article therefore briefly considers three arguments that a
constitutional rule encouraging pre-takings planning may produce better
takings policy. First, it is possible that participatory planning processes
may minimize the non-instrumental, dignitary harms generated by the
use of eminent domain to achieve private-to-private transfers of property.
Second, planning may reduce the likelihood that Takers will use the
"economic development" rationale to disguise the use of eminent domain
for purely private purposes. And, third, planning may increase the
likelihood that economic development projects will succeed.
A.

PlanningandLegitimacy

In my previous work, I argued that economic development takings
may generate high, non-instrumental dignitary losses-uncompensated
harms that result from the nature of the government's action, rather than
the property's subjective or economic value to an owner.97 I based this

conclusion on a number of related factors. First, every exercise of
eminent domain "singles out" individual property owners to bear the cost
of advancing broader societal goals.98 Knowing that the government could

96. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990); accordParrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541
(1981) (rejecting demand for pre-deprivation hearing because it is difficult to conceive of how
the State could provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place). Furthermore,
in a situation analogous to the taking of property by eminent domain, the Supreme Court
invalidated on due process grounds state laws permitting the replevin of personal property prior
to a pre-confiscation hearing, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), although lower courts have
rejected efforts to extend this rule to invalidate quick-take eminent domain procedures. See
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 706 F.2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1983); Vazza v.
Campbell, 520 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1975); Joiner v. City of Dallas, 380 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Tex.),
aff'd, 419 U.S. 1042 (1974).
97. See Garnett, supra note 5.
98. See, e.g., James G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1277, 1305-06 (1985) (arguing that eminent domain results in high
demoralization costs because it pits individuals against the state); see also Levmore, supra note
27, at 1344 (articulating "singling out" as basis for compensation); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A
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have taken someone else's property may lead owners to feel that the
government has treated them unfairly vis-A-vis others whose property was

not taken. Economic development takings may also generate what might
be called "expressive" harms.99 Owners may be insulted by the taking,

viewing it as tantamount to a government declaration that their property
would be put to a more socially beneficial use by someone else. Indeed,
some owners sound as if they were motivated to file public use claims in
part because they are so offended by the message sent by the taking."°
The insult is amplified by the fact that, as Jim Krier and Christopher
Serkin have observed, many economic development condemnations leave
owners in a particularly unenviable position. Not only have they been
singled out to bear the brunt of generating public benefits, but their very
displacement also makes it likely that they will not enjoy the benefit of
the prosperity promised by the economic development project.' Finally,

the private beneficiaries

frequently receive

a windfall from the

transaction. In the economic development context, eminent domain
almost always generates assembly gains that raise the value of the
property. Because the fair market value determination is made before the
condemnation, however, the original owner does not share in any
The allocation of the "condemnation bonus"
increase of that value.'
entirely to the private beneficiaries of takings may demoralize property
owners. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchamovsky have observed that
"[wihile people can view windfalls that befall another with sanguinity,
when the windfall arrives as a result of a strategic and deliberate decision

CriticalReexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence,90 MICH. L. REV. 1892 (1992) (greater
scrutiny needed when concentrated groups impose costs on individuals); Merrill, supra note 26,
at 880 (arguing that "fair share" justification for regulatory takings reflects principle that the
Takings Clause prohibits "spot" redistribution).
99. On expressivism, see, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive
Theories of Law A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1528 (2000) ("A person
suffers expressive harm when she is treated according to principles that express negative or
inappropriate attitudes toward her.").
100. See Eleanor Charles, Eminent Domain Challenged in New London Project, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at 9 (describing residents' reactions to New London, Connecticut eminent
domain and commercial development); Sylvian Metz, Family A warded for Nissan Land Battle,
CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Mar. 31, 2003, at 1B (describing residents' reactions to
Canton, Mississippi eminent domain and commercial development).
101. James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 86769.
102. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256 (1934) ("[Vjalue to be ascertained does
not include, and the owner is not entitled to compensation for any element resulting
subsequently to or because of the taking."); EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 163-64 (questioning
division on fairness grounds); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economicsof Public Use, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 61, 85 (1986) (noting that "eminent domain almost always generates a surplus" which is
awarded solely to the condemnor); cf United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377 (1943) ("The
owners ought not to gain by speculating on probable increase in value due to the Government's
activities.").
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of the government, the reaction may turn to resentment and
frustration."'' 3
One potential benefit of pre-takings planning is that the participation
in the planning process by those targeted property owners might help
minimize these dignitary harms and lend legitimacy to otherwise suspect
takings policy. For example, the literature on regulatory negotiations

generally suggests that participatory rulemaking generates a "legitimacy
benefit." Empirical studies of regulatory negotiations have found that
participants are more satisfied with both the process and the results of
collaborative rulemaking than the traditional administrative rulemaking
process." And, in the land use planning context, the new urbanists
similarly rely on lengthy, participatory community negotiation sessionscalled "charettes"-to build consensus among the diverse interests
affected by planning efforts. 5 More broadly, the idea that public
participation lends legitimacy to governance efforts finds support in the
civic republican tradition,"° as well as the literature on the dignitary value
of due process, which proceeds upon the assumption that "the right to be
heard" prior to an adverse government action is itself intrinsically
valuable. 7
The extension of the "participation yields legitimacy" argument to
the eminent domain context, however, is problematic for at least two
related reasons. First, as Saul Levmore has observed, "A central theme of
takings law is that protection is offered against the possibility that

103. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchamovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L. J. 547,579 (2002).
104. See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, RegulatoryNegotiation and the Legitimacy
Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 60, 62, 67, 80, 109-10 (2000) (discussing comprehensive study of
EPA's negotiated rulemaking process, which found that negotiations reduce conflict and
increase participant satisfaction and commitment to results). But see Cary Coglianese, Assessing
Consensus."The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997)
(providing empirical account that regulatory negotiations neither reduces rulemaking time nor
post-rulemaking litigation); cf Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual
Performance of NegotiatedRulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000) (disputing Coglianese's
methodology and findings). See generallyRichard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the
Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 89 (1995) (arguing for reforms "enhancing public
involvement in the regulatory process, largely in order to build trust").
105. See GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING
WALLS 162 (1999).
106. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554
(1988) (discussing literature).
107. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Reason, Passion and the "Progressof the Law," 10
CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 19-20 (1988) (arguing that post-termination hearing may not adequately
protect dignitary interests); Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees.
The Right to ProtectOne's Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153 (identifying, among purposes of hearing
requirement, "dignity values," including "concern for the humiliation or loss of self-respect
which a person might suffer if denied an opportunity to litigate," and "participation values,"
such as "an appreciation of litigation as one of the modes in which persons exert influence or
have their wills 'counted'). See generally JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 222-53 (1985).

ECOLOGYLA W QUARTERLY

[Vol. 34:443

majorities may mistreat minorities."'" While Kelo reemphasizes that the
Takings Clause protects against majoritarian abuses primarily through
the compensation guarantee, the claim that participation legitimizes
majoritarian decisions to single out property owners to bear public
burdens is not entirely congruous with the idea of the Takings Clause as a
minoritarian right. The second difficulty with assuming that planning can
legitimize takings policy is captured in Carol Rose's colorful observation
that "[t]here is just something about land that makes you think that when
you own it, it is really, really yours."' The loss of the autonomy
guaranteed by private property may be a primary cause of the "dignitary
harms" that attend an exercise of eminent domain. Individuals whose
property is taken by eminent domain may feel unsettled and vulnerable
when they learn that the government plans to take their property.
Eminent domain obviously eviscerates the physical autonomy guaranteed
by the boundaries of private property." ° A compulsory taking deprives an
owner of her "most essential right" to exclude others-including,
especially, the government-from her property.' l Expanding the scope of
the takings power may increase all property owners' feelings of
vulnerability. As Justice O'Connor noted in Kelo, "The specter of
condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State
any home with a
from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton,
12
shopping mall, or any farm with a factory."'
B.

A voiding Pretext

A second potential real-world benefit of Kelo's planning mandate is
suggested by Justice Kennedy's concurrence-that planning will protect
against the real possibility that Takers will respond to illegitimate
overtures of developers seeking private benefit. The risk of private rent
seeking in situations like the one facing New London prior to Kelo is
certainly substantial. It is no secret that local government officials with

108.
109.

Saul Levmore, Just Compensationand Just Politics,22 CONN. L. REV. 285,309 (1990).
Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1143 (1996)

(reviewing

WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS

(1995)).
110. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Propertyas the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
329, 345 (1996) (describing the "independence argument" for property).
111. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) ("[T]he
landowner's right to exclude [is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
characterized as property."') (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979));
see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at
176); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,831 (1987) (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433).
112. 545 U.S. 469, 503. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also William A. Fischel, The Political
Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How FederalGrants EncourageExcessive Use of Eminent
Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 929, 949 ("Expansion of eminent domain's scope raises the
anxiety that even more uses will soon be found, and no one's property will be safe.").
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their "economic back to the wall"'1 3 have demonstrated a seemingly
limitless willingness to promote development through a dizzying array of
subsidies, including the sale (or sometimes the gift) of property seized by
eminent domain." 4 Both practical experience and economic theory
demonstrate why the government's ability to bypass the market, and
therefore avoid holdouts and other land assembly problems, makes
eminent domain an attractive "incentive" to offer to private companies.
The potential beneficiaries have a substantial incentive to engage in rent
seeking to secure the benefit of this bypass (not to mention to capture all
or part of the "condemnation bonus" discussed above)." 5
Will comprehensive planning temper local officials' desire to
respond to private entities promising to promote economic development
in exchange for free land?" 6 The evidence is mixed. On the one hand, the
planning process may give property owners (and especially homeowners)
an opportunity to organize so as to protect their interests. As Daniel
Farber has observed, homeowners targeted by eminent domain do have
some advantages that increase the likelihood of political success:
They form a small group (relative to the electorate at least) and often
have high stakes (since they are about to have large amounts of
property seized by the state). They also have the advantage of sharing
a geographical connection, and that proximity makes it easier to form

113. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 467 (Mich.
1981) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004).
114. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves. Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 382-89 (describing
common incentives); Clayton P. Gillette, The Law and Economics of Federalism:Business
Incentives. InterstateCompetition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 479 (1997)
(describing common incentives); Michael H. Schill, Deconcentratingthe Inner City Poor, 67
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 795, 809-10 & n.73 (1991) (discussing enterprise zones, tax abatements and
exemptions, subsidized loans and industrial revenue bonds). Government incentives for
development are hardly a new phenomenon, see OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN,
COMMONWEALTH (rev. ed. 1969) (describing early state development policies), but the diversity
of the subsidy methods and the amount of money offered appear to have crested during the past
two decades, see KENNETH THOMAS, COMPETING FOR CAPITAL: EUROPE AND NORTH
AMERICA IN A GLOBAL ERA 159 (2000) (estimating that total subsidies from state and local
governments now exceed $50 billion annually); Enrich, supra,at 386-87.
115. See., e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 40, at 161-81; Merrill, supra note 102, at 85-87.
116. See ROBERT G. DREHER & JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, KELoIS UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS: THE POLICY DEBATE OVER THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 20-21, 24-25 (2006) (suggesting that careful planning will forestall capture by

the would-be recipients of property seized by eminent domain); AM. PLANNING ASS'N, POLICY
GUIDE ON PUBLIC REDEVELOPMENT 13 (2004) (arguing that "an open and inclusive public
participation process will prevent the frequent accusations of secret government maneuverings
and developer favoritism that often plague redevelopment programs"); John D. Echeverria, The
Triumph of Justice Stevens and the Principleof Generality,7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 22 (2005-2006),
availableat http://www.vjel.org/articles/pdf/ sorryforthepdf5.pdf (arguing that the "generality" of
New London's development plan safeguards against "faction" and "singling out").
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into a group and to identify them in the first place. As neighbors, they
are likely to have community ties that make organization easier."n
On the other hand, the "developer influence model" of public choice
theory posits that developers-including the would-be beneficiaries of
economic development takings-frequently are a dominating force
shaping the outcome of the planning process, rather than the passive
followers of the rules that emerge from it."' And, even those scholars
(especially William Fischel) who make the case that homeowners usually
exert more influence than developers in local planning processes " 9 agree
that the "influence model best fits central cities, and the majoritarian
model, elite suburbs."' 2
In other words, developers are most likely to exert influence over the
planning processes in the very communities most likely to engage in
comprehensive redevelopment efforts like New London's Fort Trumbull
project-center cities struggling to redevelop struggling urban cores.'2 '
And, it is worth remembering that, despite the Court's insistence in Kelo
that Pfizer was not the moving force behind (or primary beneficiary of)
the Fort Trumbull project, Pfizer was the "10,000 pound gorilla" in
discussions about what uses to incorporate into the development plan.122
As Susette Kelo's lawyers emphasized in their brief before the Court:
[T]he development plan contains all of Pfizer's "requirements" that it
set forth in agreeing to build its global research facility in New
London: a luxury hotel for its clients, upscale housing for its
employees, and office space for its contractors . . .as well as the
overall "redevelopment" of the Fort Trumbull neighborhood adjacent
to Pfizer, in addition to other upgrades to the area that it demanded:
renovation of the state park and sewage treatment plant upgrades. 2 '
Indeed, the extent of the interactions between New London and Pfizer
strongly suggests that planning did not eliminate private influence over

117. Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice andJust Compensation,9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 289
(1992).
118. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385,408-10 (1977) (describing model).
119. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 72-97 (2001);
NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF

RIGHTS 60-70 (2001) (describing "two force model of politics" in the land use planning context,
which is characterized by both "fear of the few" and "fear of the many").
120. Ellickson, supra note 118, at 409; see also FISCHEL, supranote 119, at 90-94.
121.

See BERNARD J. FRIEDAN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW AMERICA

REBUILDS CITIES, ch. 7 (1989) (describing modern day redevelopment efforts as a "dealmaking"
process).
122. Brief of Petitioners, supra note 8, at 4-5 (quoting Respondent's expert).
123. Id at 5.
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the Fort Trumbull redevelopment effort. It remains to be seen to what
24
extent planning can or will temper such influence in future cases.1
C

PlanningandDevelopment Success

One final question is whether Kelo's planning mandate promotes
sound development policy. If planning works, in other words, Kelo may
increase the likelihood that economic development efforts will succeed by
encouraging planning. As above, the evidence on this point is mixed, and
worthy of more in-depth consideration than possible in this short article.
Many redevelopment experts champion planning as essential to project
success, as one would expect, because most redevelopment experts are
themselves planners."z In addition to the potential legitimacy benefit
outlined above, participatory planning also is said to serve an
information-generating function that helps government decision makers
to be better informed about the consequences of their actions.1 16 That
said, planning for urban redevelopment efforts like the one at issue in
Kelo has a rather checkered record. For example, the imposition of rigid,
federally
mandated
planning
requirements -which
required
redevelopment agencies to conceive of a plan and acquire the land
needed for it before soliciting private developers' participation-likely
contributed to the failure of many redevelopment efforts during the
Urban Renewal period from the 1950s through the early 1970s."z'

124. See Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, Bad Judgment, 38
URB. LAW. 201, 203 (2006) (arguing that "all the condemning municipality needs to do now is
proffer self-manufactured plans for the proposed taking"); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Human
Nature of Freedom and Identity- We Hold More than Random Thoughts, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 33, 45-46 (2005) (characterizing New London's development as "capture" by Pfizer
and criticizing Court's reliance on "planning and town meetings" to prevent oppression by
factional interests).
125. See, e.g., AM. PLANNING AS'N, supra note 1166; DOWNTOWNS: REVITALIZING THE
CENTERS OF SMALL URBAN COMMUNITIES (Michael A. Burayidi ed., 2001).

126. See, e.g., Freeman & Langbein, supra note 1044, at 88 (finding that regulatory
negotiations generally improved quality of information available); see also Alejandro Esteban
Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality.
Community In volvement andAdaptive Planningin Land Use Decisions,Installment 2, 24 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 269, 309 (2005) (arguing that participatory planning has the "potential to generate
land use agreements that are more legitimate and higher-quality-namely, fairer, better planned
and more efficient.").
127. See Lyman Brownfield, The Disposition Problem in Urban Renewal. 25 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 732 (1960). On the failure of urban renewal, see generally Schill, supra note
1144, at 808-09 ("The number of jobs created and amount of private sector investment
generated by the program were below the hopes and expectations of its proponents.
Furthermore, the human toll caused by displacement and the destabilization of nearby
residential communities casts doubt on the efficacy of subsidized site assembly .... "); Nicole
Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Ouestion as a Takings Problem, 71 G.W. L. REV. 934, 954-55
(2003) (discussing literature on urban renewal).
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A number of factors distinguish modern economic development
efforts from Urban Renewal-era efforts, ranging from project scale to the
type of planning involved (i.e., expert-driven versus participatory)." z
And, conventional wisdom also holds that local governments have gotten
better at redevelopment.129 Those touting urban "success stories" must,
however, also contend with dismal failures. 3 ° In some cases, even floating
a redevelopment proposal may cause residents and businesses to
rationally anticipate future displacement by deferring maintenance
and/or relocating before a mass exodus depresses property values.13
Ultimately, the government may end up holding a large amount of land
that has been rendered uninhabitable, and therefore "unrenewable,"
precisely because the government threatened to take the land to renew it.
And, because many relocated businesses fail, renewal efforts can have the
perverse effect of permanently removing businesses from downtown-a
particularly troubling prospect because the businesses "renewed" out of
business may be long-term stakeholders that stuck it out through
economically difficult times. 132
CONCLUSION

Kelo's third surprise-the majority's emphasis on the extensive,
participatory planning-has largely been overshadowed by the postdecisional uproar in the popular press and the legislative chambers. While
only time will tell how Kelo's planning mandate will influence future

128. See Peter Hall, The Turbulent Eighth Decade: Challenges to American City Planning,
55 J. AM. PLANNING ASs'N 275 (1989).
129. See generally FRIEDAN & SAGALYN, supra note 1211, at 171-239 (discussing the
debate over the "downtown mall" phenomenon). Cf Kirk Johnson, A Plan Without a Master
Rebuilding by Committee? Robert Moses Would Cringe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002, at 35
(discussing negatives of the "democratization" of urban planning in context of "Ground Zero"
redevelopment).
130. See generally John P. Elwood, Rethinking Government Participation in Urban
Renewal: Neighborhood Revitalization in New Haven, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 138 (1994)
(describing the history of failed redevelopment efforts).
131. Id at 177-78; see also. e.g., City of Buffalo v. George Irish Paper Co., 299 N.Y.S.2d 8,
14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969), affd, 26 N.Y.2d 869 (1970) (holding that "cloud of condemnation"
resulting from a redevelopment proposal effected a de facto taking of property; plaintiff's
tenants refused to renew leases after learning of the plans). This problem is pervasive enough
that courts have developed the doctrine of "condemnation blight" to deal with it. See 4 JULIUS
L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN I 12B.17[6] (2006) (defining condemnation blight
as the "debilitating effect upon value of a threatened, imminent or potential condemnation").
132. See, e.g., Elwood, supra note 130, at 179 (discussing business failure); Peter W. Salsich,
Jr., Displacement and Urban Reinvestment: A Mount Laurel Perspective, 53 U. CINN. L. REV.
333, 371 (1984):
Perhaps the major moral issue is the basic question of whether it is morally acceptable
for society to allow a poor person to be forced from his home in order to bring new
investment and new people into a particular neighborhood. We have been doing that
for at least forty years, but the question does not go away.
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litigation and future projects, this Article represents a brief initial effort
to sort through the implications-practical and legal-of the Court's
decision to encourage pre-takings planning efforts.
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